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This essay addresses a void in torts scholarship and 
pedagogy—the relationship between remedies and race in U.S. tort 
law.  In virtually all torts scholarship and teaching, the unspoken 
assumptions are that race and racism are extrinsic to the torts system 
and that all parties are white unless otherwise specified.  Torts 
scholars and casebooks discuss important cases from the early part of 
the twentieth century, and invariably mention the historical context 
of technology and industrialization.  Yet, historical and 
contemporary context about torts and race generally is absent in 
scholarship and teaching.  
This essay, part of a larger effort to explore issues of race and 
gender in torts, proceeds in two parts.1  First, I challenge the 
 
* Sumner T. Bernstein Professor of Law, University of Maine School of 
Law. 
1. Martha Chamallas and I are writing a book on this subject.  MARTHA 
CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, 
AND THE LAW OF TORTS (forthcoming 2008).  Other already published and 
forthcoming works that discuss some of these issues are Martha Chamallas, The 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270756
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boundary between rights and remedies by highlighting a stunning but 
previously overlooked 1959 instance of an individual tort remedy 
serving as a significant civil rights remedy in the integration of 
public transportation throughout the South.2  Second, I outline the 
whiteness of the civil justice system and focus on neglected material 
concerning the relationship between race and damages from 1865 to 
the present.3  The torts system provided access to indigent plaintiffs, 
black and white, during periods when poor people were otherwise 
denied legal representation in every other context.  Yet, the system 
worked by means that resulted in the classic torts remedy, money, 
being less readily dispensed to black plaintiffs than to other tort 
plaintiffs.  Recent evidence suggests that tort remedies are still 
affected by race in ways that merit more exploration. 
The methodological barriers to making definitive statements 
about the torts system are familiar and significant.  Tort litigation 
involves individualized adjudication of liability and damages.  
Comparing liability decisions and damage awards in different 
Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463 (1998); 
Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Torts Cases: Race, Gender, and the 
Calculation of Economic Loss, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1435 (2005) [hereinafter 
Chamallas, Civil Rights]; Martha Chamallas, The September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund: Rethinking the Damages Element in Injury Law, 71 TENN. L. 
REV. 51 (2003); Jennifer B. Wriggins, Torts, Race, and the Value of Injury, 1900–
1949, 49 HOW. L.J. 99 (2005) [hereinafter Wriggins, Torts]; Jennifer B. Wriggins, 
Toward a Feminist Revision of Torts, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13 
(2005) [hereinafter Wriggins, Feminist Revision]; and Jennifer B. Wriggins, 
Whiteness, Equal Treatment, and the Valuation of Injury, 1900–1949, in FAULT 
LINES: TORT LAW AND CULTURAL PRACTICE (David Engel & Michael McCann, 
eds., forthcoming 2008).  Thanks to Martha Chamallas and Deborah Tuerkheimer 
for reading drafts of this essay, to my research assistant Erin Krause, to the 
librarians of the Garbrecht Law Library at the University of Maine School of Law, 
and to Douglas Laycock for his work on this symposium. 
2. Bullock v. Tamiami Trails Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1959). 
3. This essay focuses on cases involving those perceived to be African-
American and Caucasian.  Cases involving those perceived to be of other races 
have not been researched for this essay, although that is an important area for 
future study.  “African-American” and “black” are used interchangeably.  This 
essay does not take a position on whether race is something biologically “real” or 
not.  In these cases, litigants are not explicitly challenging the racial designation 
applied to them.  For further discussion, see the excellent book IAN F. HANEY 
LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996) and 
Wriggins, Torts, supra note 1, at 100 (discussing the incompleteness of 
conventional understandings of the tort system because of erroneous assumptions 
regarding the extent and effect of race in the system). 




                                                
decisions to see if injuries are treated consistently is rarely done.  
Enforcement is decentralized and occurs almost exclusively through 
private attorneys.  Settlements and verdicts are often unreported.  
There is no comprehensive databank, and in the late nineteenth 
century and the first half of the twentieth century there was even less 
information available than there is now.  Moreover, comprehensive 
information about the incidence of injury, as well as wage data, is 
not readily available for the late nineteenth century and the first half 
of the twentieth century.  In addition, determining the race of tort 
litigants is not necessarily easy.  Although appellate judges in torts 
cases during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
routinely referred to the race of plaintiffs and witnesses when other 
than white, they did this less frequently after 1950.4  Bearing in mind 
that comprehensive conclusions would be premature, tort law and 
race are intertwined in crucial ways.  Tort law played an unheralded 
but significant role in desegregating interstate public transportation, 
as described in Part II.  Further, race and racism have affected the 
calculation of damages, largely to the detriment of African-American 
claimants, as shown in Parts III and IV.5  The essay concludes with 
reflections on the implications of the racial history of tort damages 
for contemporary efforts to make tort remedies more consistent. 
 
 
II. RACE, REMEDIES, AND RECOGNITION 
 
The recognition of an individual, private wrong can be a 
broad remedy in itself with significant ramifications for racial 
 
4. BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER, 
RACE, LAW, AND THE RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 1865–1920 (2001) (discussing 
hundreds of cases from the early twentieth century identifying the race of black 
plaintiffs); Wriggins, Torts, supra note 1, at 105 (discussing appellate courts’ 
practice of referring to African-American plaintiffs as “colored” or “negro” in the 
first half of the twentieth century). 
5. One common question is whether judges applied race-based torts 
principles and standards of liability.  My preliminary answer is generally in the 
negative.  See Wriggins, Torts, supra note 1, at 105 n.26 (discussing cases in 
which a race-based liability rule was claimed by the plaintiffs, yet not adopted by 
the courts); id. at 113 n.53 (noting that more stringent standards of liability or 
specific doctrinal rules were not applied to black plaintiffs, with the possible 
exception of self-defense). 
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equality.  The Fifth Circuit decision in Bullock v. Tamiami Trail 
Tours, Inc. reflects this.6  This case deserves to be widely taught and 
included in citations to duties of common carriers.  It is a tort remedy 
for an individual case, but its wide implications demonstrate its 
importance as a civil rights remedy. 
The events at issue in the case took place on an interstate bus 
in Florida at the same time that the Montgomery bus boycott was 
taking place.7  A married couple from Jamaica came to Florida as 
tourists in late summer 1956, intending to travel by bus to New York 
in order to “see more of the country-side.”8  They arrived just seven 
months after the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) had 
ordered integration of interstate public transportation, including the 
very bus on which they were going to take their sightseeing trip.9  
They boarded a bus in Miami, and sat together in the front.10  The 
husband, Reverend Bullock, “was dark or black,” while the wife 
“though a Negress, appeared” to be white.11  Not far from Miami, a 
white passenger complained to the driver about where Reverend 
Bullock was sitting, and the driver asked him to move to the back of 
the bus.12  He refused to move back.13  When the bus stopped in the 
middle of the night at a northern Florida restaurant that was used as a 
bus stop after midnight, the bus driver told some people in the 
restaurant about the Bullocks’ presence in the front of the bus and 
 
6. 266 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1959), rev’g 162 F. Supp. 203 (N.D. Fla. 1958).  
This case is discussed further in Wriggins, Feminist Revision, supra note 1, at 
148–152.  The Fifth Circuit’s decision contains much fascinating detail that space 
limitations make it impossible to discuss fully here. 
7. CATHERINE A. BARNES, JOURNEY FROM JIM CROW: THE DESEGREGATION 
OF SOUTHERN TRANSIT 108–24 (1983).  The Montgomery Bus Boycott, an 
important early victory in the struggle for racial equality in the twentieth century, 
began after Rosa Parks, on December 1, 1955, refused to move to the back of the 
bus.  African-American residents of Montgomery, Alabama organized a boycott of 
the city’s segregated buses which lasted over a year and eventually resulted in a 
United States Supreme Court decision affirming a Fifth Circuit decision holding 
that segregation in public transportation was illegal and in successful integration of 
the buses.  Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 717 (M.D. Ala. 1956), aff’d, 352 
U.S. 903 (1956); BARNES, supra, at 108–127. 
8. Bullock, 162 F. Supp. at 204. 
9. BARNES, supra note 7, at 98. 
10. Bullock, 162 F. Supp. at 204. 
11. Bullock, 266 F.2d at 328. 
12. Bullock, 162 F. Supp. at 204. 
13. Id. 




                                                
about how they had refused to move to the rear.14  Milton Poppell, a 
white farmer who lived nearby, overheard the conversation, bought a 
ticket, boarded the bus, told the Bullocks to move to the rear, and 
when they declined, he slapped Mrs. Bullock and beat Rev. Bullock, 
injuring his face and body.15  Mr. Poppell later testified that he was 
particularly incensed, not only that a black man would ever sit in the 
front of a bus, but also that a black man was married to and sitting 
with a white woman in the front of the bus.16  When the Bullocks 
sued the bus company for their injuries, Federal District Judge 
DeVane ruled against them, holding that the attack was 
unforeseeable and the bus company could not be held responsible.17  
Calling segregation in public transportation a voluntary preference of 
the black population, the judge termed this the only instance of 
unprovoked assault in the four-year history of desegregating public 
transit in Florida and the South.18 
The Fifth Circuit reversed and actually found the bus 
company liable, remanding only for a determination of damages.19  
The court was called upon to apply Florida law to the case, and 
found the attack foreseeable, largely because of the social conditions 
of the day.20  Judge Rives wrote that “the folkways prevalent in 
Taylor County, Florida . . . would cause a reasonable man, familiar 
with local customs, to anticipate that violence might result if a Negro 
man and a seemingly white woman should ride into the county 
seated together toward the front of an interurban bus.”21  Context 
was everything; “mischief was hovering about,”22 and the bus 
company did not do enough to prevent the attack. 
 
14. Id.  There was a factual dispute about whether the people the driver told 
included a police officer or not.  Id.  
15. Id. at 205. 
16. Bullock, 266 F.2d at 338 n.1.  
17. Bullock, 162 F. Supp. at 205.  
18. Id.  
19. Bullock, 266 F.2d at 332. 
20. Id. 
21. Id.  
22. Id. at 331.  The damages remedy would not have been available for a 
truly random attack.  To begin to convey a sense of the taboo attached to 
interracial couples, at the time of the attack, Florida had a statute forbidding 
racially mixed heterosexual couples from habitually occupying the same room “in 
the nighttime” which was in effect until struck down by the Supreme Court in 
1964 in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).  Extensive violence that 
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The damages remedy for the Bullocks was an individual, 
retrospective remedy and hopefully provided some compensation for 
their physical and psychological injuries.  But the Fifth Circuit’s 
liability determination against the bus company was, in effect, a 
broad remedial order.  The order finding liability for the individual 
bus company could be reworded to state as follows: “We remind all 
interstate bus companies that they have to allow black people, 
interracial couples, and couples who appear to be interracial to sit in 
the front of buses as the ICC has previously ordered.  Second, all 
interstate bus companies are hereby ordered to protect such 
passengers from attacks by other people including other passengers, 
and if they fail to do so they will be liable for damages to the injured 
passengers.”  The court order was a broad affirmative injunction as 
well as a doctrinal recognition that this particular bus company was 
liable for these particular past injuries.  If future bus companies 
violated this de facto injunction, the remedy would be compensatory 
damages.  Coming from the Fifth Circuit at this time, when it was 
comprised of not only Florida, but also Alabama, Mississippi, 
Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas, this decision was a significant part of 
the court’s work in dismantling legal segregation in the South.23   
While the issue of whether and to what extent tort liability 
actually deters behavior is perpetually debated, it seems unassailable 
that this particular remedy was the kind of tort remedy most likely to 
act as a deterrent.24  This is because it was a clear public statement, 
by a court that covered a broad geographic area, against the precise 
type of defendant—an interstate bus carrier—that the judges most 
likely wanted to affect.25 
accompanied desegregation of public transportation has been well documented.  
See, e.g., BARNES, supra note 7, at 38–40, 62 (citing incidents of violence between 
people of different races on public transportation).  
23. See, e.g., Charles Clark, Forward: The Role of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the Civil Rights Movement, 16 MISS. C. L. REV. 271 
(1996) (describing the role of the Fifth Circuit as a forerunner in starting a new era 
of race relations, particularly in regard to employment and education).  
24. See, e.g., Gary Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: 
Does the Tort System Actually Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 416–19 (1994) 
(citing several examples of commercial landowners instituting protective measures 
in response to the liability threat). 
25. The Fifth Circuit’s opinion contains some rather equivocal language 
about preventive measures that the bus company could have taken to prevent the 
harm; for example, that the driver could have told the Bullocks why he wanted 
them to move.  Bullock, 266 F.2d at 332.  However, given that the judges found 




                                                                                                                
Significantly, three years before the Bullock opinion was 
written (and two months before the Bullocks were attacked), Judge 
Rives, who wrote the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Bullock, had written 
the initial decision in the Montgomery bus boycott case.  The 
opinion, holding that the laws and ordinances requiring segregation 
on Montgomery’s buses were unconstitutional, was later upheld by 
the U.S. Supreme Court.26  In Bullock, by ruling that the bus 
company breached its duty by failing to protect the couple and warn 
them of possible violence, the court in effect “sided” with persons 
who were defying the segregation customs of the day.  It signaled 
that the court would be willing to do so on other occasions and 
foreshadowed the struggle over integration of public facilities.  By 
reshaping the duty to protect, the court afforded a broad prospective 
civil rights remedy in tort for private racial violence.   
 
 
III. 1865–1950, DAMAGE REMEDIES: A PRELIMINARY PICTURE  
 
A. The Whiteness of the Civil Justice System 
 
One of the obvious ways in which whiteness was the norm in 
tort remedies is that, until the first half of the twentieth century, the 
decisionmakers in civil cases—jurors, lawyers, and judges—were 
almost exclusively white and male.27  Particularly following the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the wider culture was divided by 
discriminatory laws, policies, and customs, and by a race-based caste 
system that placed African-Americans below whites, allowed 
that the Bullocks should have been protected from attack in the actual 
circumstances of the case, when Mr. Bullock had been asked to move and had 
declined, it seems unlikely that they would have been barred from recovery if the 
driver had told them the reason for moving and they had still refused to move. 
26. Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956), aff’d, 352 U.S. 
903 (1956). 
27. See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth 
Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 75–93 (1990) (describing how Southern states created laws 
aimed at precluding African-Americans from serving as jurors); J. CLAY SMITH, 
JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER 1844–1944, app. 2, tbl. 
13 (1993) (showing that the number of black lawyers in the United States in 1940 
was less than one percent of the number of white lawyers). 
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pervasive violence by whites against them, and denied them political 
power.28 
Another way in which whiteness was the norm is that the 
race of litigants and witnesses was not mentioned in appellate tort 
opinions unless it was other than white.  “Colored” man or woman, 
“Negro” man or woman, and occasionally “Negress,” were terms 
used to describe litigants and witnesses who were not white.29  
Contemporary readers sometimes can infer that a litigant was white 
from the location of the tort or the descriptive language.  For 
example, in one wrongful death case the decedent was struck by a 
flying timber while “in the waiting room for white passengers.”30  In 
another opinion, a wife who was sitting in the “ladies’ waiting room” 
of a railroad station and who was insulted by a “negro woman” 
attendant necessarily was white.31  Railroads in the early twentieth 
century often had a specific waiting room for white women, 
customarily known as “the ladies’ waiting room.”32  The plaintiff’s 
location in that waiting room while being attended by an African-
American employee of the railroad established her as white.  
Appellate judges did not articulate these inferences.  The norm to 
appellate judges was that people were white, and only departures 
from that norm needed identification. 
 
B. Access to Tort Remedies—Legal Representation  
 
Beginning in at least the late nineteenth century, African-
Americans won tort cases before juries and appellate courts in every 
region.  Part of this success must be due to one of the enforcement 
 
28. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 114–22, 280–348 (2002) (pointing to widespread laws hostile to 
African-Americans effectively barring them from participation in civil, political, 
and social life); WELKE, supra note 4, at 365 (describing justifications for 
segregation laws including the allegation that race-mixing would lead to violence 
and social disruption); C. VAN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 
98 (1974) (discussing discrimination and segregation laws). 
29. See Wriggins, Torts, supra note 1, at 111 n.48 (describing references to 
litigants’ race and terms used to describe African-Americans). 
30. Taylor v. Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pac. Ry. Co., 91 So. 732, 732 (La. 
1922). 
31. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Luther, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 517, 519, 90 S.W. 
44, 45 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905). 
32. WELKE, supra note 4, at 276–277.  White women’s children and 
husbands were also permitted in the waiting room.  Id. 




                                                
mechanisms of torts—contingency fee agreements.  Contingency fee 
agreements have been widely used in tort litigation since at least the 
middle of the nineteenth century.33  Since lawyers were almost 
universally white, it was white lawyers who represented black 
plaintiffs in tort cases soon after slavery ended.  While long 
criticized as fomenting litigation,34 contingency fee agreements were 
and are an egalitarian feature of the legal system.  Contingency fee 
agreements, because they aligned, to some degree, the financial 
incentives of plaintiffs’ tort lawyers with those of their clients, 
allowed poor clients who could not pay a lawyer’s fees to have some 
access to the tort system.  The United States African-American 
population has always been disproportionately poor.35  The 
contingency fee system provided access to tort remedies for African-
Americans at a time when no other part of the legal system supplied 
lawyers for them. 
These early tort cases were brought and won during periods 
when poor litigants, of whatever race, lacked attorneys.  They were 
brought long before Gideon v. Wainwright mandated lawyers for 
indigent criminal defendants charged with serious crimes,36 before 
states began supplying lawyers to indigent parents in child protective 
cases,37 and before the Legal Services Corporation provided some 
 
33. Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The 
Sanctioning of Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 
231, 231 (1998). 
34. Herman Melville in his 1846 book, Typee, includes tort lawyers in a list 
of the maddening and unfortunate aspects of ‘civilization,’ in contrast to the idyllic 
life on the Marquesa Islands which the book chronicled: “There were none of 
those thousand sources of irritation that the ingenuity of civilized man has created 
to mar his own felicity . . . no assault and battery attorneys, to foment discord, 
backing their clients up to a quarrel, and then knocking their heads together.” 
HERMAN MELVILLE, TYPEE 242 (1846), reprinted in HERMAN MELVILLE, TYPEE: A 
PEEP AT POLYNESIAN LIFE; OMOO: A NARRATIVE OF ADVENTURES IN THE SOUTH 
SEAS; MARDI: AND A VOYAGE THITHER (G. Thomas Tonselle ed., Viking Press 
1982). While Melville did not explicitly mention contingency fee agreements, his 
implication is that the attorneys had a financial incentive to create tort suits, which 
is a perennial criticism of contingency fee attorneys. 
35. See, e.g., ARNOLD ROSE, THE NEGRO IN AMERICA 68–73 (1948) 
(describing geographic and employment factors as well as traditional exploitation 
of blacks by whites as creating a dire economic situation for blacks). 
36. 372 U.S. 335, 348 (1963). 
37. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 34 (1981) (citing 
sources from the 1960s and 1970s recommending such appointments and noting 
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representation in civil cases for clients who lacked resources to hire 
attorneys.38  In terms of poor people’s access to legal representation, 
the contrast between the torts system and the rest of the legal system 
could hardly be more extreme. 
This is not to say that the contingent fee system was perfectly 
egalitarian.  Its financial incentives meant that cases with lower 
financial values attached to them would have been less attractive for 
lawyers to bring.  To the extent that claims of black men and women 
were valued less by the tort system than the claims of white men and 
women, the blacks’ claims would have been correlatively less 
attractive for contingent fee lawyers to pursue.  Preliminary 
information suggests that black plaintiffs were underrepresented as 
plaintiffs relative to their proportion in the population, although more 
information is necessary to draw firm conclusions as to the reasons 
for this.39  Moreover, much conduct that was tortious as well as 
criminal could not be pursued through the torts system because of 
political and other barriers.40 
 
that as of 1981, 17 states did not require appointment of counsel for termination of 
parental rights cases). 
38. The federal Legal Services Corporation was founded in 1974. 42 U.S.C. § 
2996 et seq. (1974). 
39. For example, Louisiana’s black population ranged from 47.1% in 1900 to 
32% in 1950.  Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on 
Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1790 to 1990, 
For the United States, Regions, Divisions, and States (Working Paper No. 56, tbl. 
33 (2002)), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/ 
twps0056.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2008).  By contrast, in appellate wrongful 
death cases that featured published opinions regarding the measure of damages, 
black claimants comprised only 17.1% of the total claimants.  Id.  It is also very 
difficult to estimate accident rates in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.  
See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, 
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 25, 59 (2003) (citing 
family employer self-reporting and the boom of personal injury cases at the turn of 
the century as complicating estimations of the actual accident rates). 
40. One of the few civil cases involving damages from a lynching involved 
the lynching of a white man.  Williams v. Great S. Lumber, 277 U.S. 19 (1928); 
see also Wriggins, Torts, supra note 1, at 106 n.28 (noting the conspicuous 
absence of any reported cases in which black plaintiffs sought compensation for 
lynchings). 




                                                
C. Access to Tort Remedies—Money Damages  
 
The classic tort remedy, of course, is money to compensate 
for an injury.  The traditional dichotomy is between economic 
damages and noneconomic damages.  Both noneconomic and 
economic damages have a long history as remedies.41  Broadly 
speaking, economic damages generally have included lost wages, 
lost future earnings, pecuniary loss, medical expenses, and the like.  
Noneconomic damages have included pain and suffering, mental 
anguish, loss of consortium, and in some states and contexts, grief.  
Instructions given to jurors as to the measure of damages have long 
been vague.42  Jurors have been told to make an individualistic 
determination of the damages remedy, particular to the plaintiff, and 
not based on group-based schedules of projected compensation.  
However, when it is difficult to make an individual projection of 
what a person would have earned in the absence of injury, such as 
when a person has no track record of earnings or dies or becomes 
disabled at a young age, courts and juries often resort to group-based 
data, such as earnings tables or mortality tables.  Group-based data 
such as mortality tables have been used to inform damage 
determinations in cases of death and permanent disability for more 
than one hundred years.43  Values determined by jurors who actually 
decide cases have long been influential in determining settlement 
values. 
Focusing solely on economic damages, one would expect 
African-Americans’ tort claims to be valued less than whites’ tort 
claims because of the lower earnings of African-Americans.44  
 
41. See Robert L. Rabin, Pain and Suffering and Beyond: Some Thoughts on 
Recovery for Intangible Loss, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 362–67 (2006) (comparing 
historical examples of torts that award economic damages with torts that award 
noneconomic, “intangible” damages). 
42. See id. at 374 (“In the realm of accident law, model jury instructions on 
compensatory damages offer no clue as to a methodology for calculating pain and 
suffering awards.”). 
43. See, e.g., Central Law Journal et al. eds., Admissibility of Life or 
Mortality Tables in Evidence in Cases of Death or Permanent Injury, for the 
Purpose of Estimating the Amount of Damages, 55 CENT. L. J. 101, Col. 2 (Aug. 8, 
1902) (noting that the general rule is to admit mortality tables in all cases of 
personal injury). 
44. See ROSE, supra note 35, at 68–73 (discussing the historic reasons behind 
African-American poverty). 
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However, class and economic inequality do not tell the whole story.  
Noneconomic damages were available for many torts, and these 
damages allowed consideration of factors other than earnings.  But 
the award of this type of damages was affected by a myriad of 
psychological and cultural mechanisms that devalued the losses 
suffered by black plaintiffs and seemed, from whites’ perspectives, 
to call for a lesser remedy. 
 
1. Pre-Trial Settlement 
 
Published information about race and settlement during this 
period is scarce but provocative.  For example, according to a 1905 
article in the Street Railway Journal, 4.7% of the cases settled by the 
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company in 1904 involved black 
claimants, but only 2.3% of the damages paid actually went to these 
claimants.45  This is a significant disparity, but it could stem from 
differences in pre-accident earnings, seriousness of injury, or many 
other factors.  More study of this would be useful, particularly as it 
involves other large defendants like railroads, in view of those 
defendants’ importance as actors in the torts system. 
Since most tort cases for decades have been resolved through 
pretrial settlements, the behavior and attitudes of people employed to 
settle cases against powerful defendants like railroads were 
significant.  Perhaps such railway claims agents, now called claims 
adjusters, made race matter to the disadvantage of blacks even if 
blacks’ earnings were the same as whites.  According to an 
influential 1927 manual for railway claims agents, “The Constitution 
of the United States guarantees its citizens the equal protection of the 
law and provides that legally no difference shall be made between 
citizens on account of a difference in race or color.  But some of 
these guarantees have come to be greatly modified in the actual life 
of the nation. . . .  A brakeman is not always a brakeman.  A white 
brakeman is a brakeman; but a negro brakeman is most likely only a 
negro.”46  This language identifies the injured white brakeman’s 
 
45. Claim and Other Departments, 26 STREET RY. J. 526, 533 (1905). 
46. SMITH R. BRITTINGHAM, THE CLAIMS AGENT AND HIS WORK 271 (1927).  
It is not clear why workers’ compensation is not referenced here, since almost all 
states had workers’ compensation programs by 1921.  See W. PAGE KEETON ET 
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 80, at 573 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing 
movement for the passage of workers’ compensation legislation). 




                                                
occupation (“brakeman”) as the dominant factor.47  But for the 
injured African-American brakeman, it singles out his race (“only a 
negro”) as the dominant factor.48  This seems to suggest that claims 
agents should focus on an African-American plaintiff’s race rather 
than his occupation in settling an African-American’s injury 
claims.49  This in turn implies that even when an injured white 
person and a similarly injured black person had the same job with the 
same salary, their claims might be treated differently by settlement 
agents.  This differential focus would have pointed in the direction of 
lower compensation for African-American claimants. 
While the race-based discount in individual cases was not 
necessarily always large, its cumulative effect may have been.  If an 
injured white brakeman and an injured black brakeman were paid 
less for the same injury, that kind of difference could have ripple 
effects over many years.  Hypothetically, one injured person might 
lose his house for lack of funds, while the more generously 
compensated person might be able to retain his house.  This in turn 
could provide potential wealth for the person’s children, and in turn, 
grandchildren, equity for future education loans, tax benefits, and 
psychological benefits that would be lacking for the person who lost 
his house.  If one then thinks about the thousands of railway and 
streetcar injuries that occurred in the first half of the twentieth 
century, the magnitude of the harm caused by disparate recovery 
becomes more visible.  This is not to say that the recovery provided 
to the injured white brakeman was adequate or generous.  It was the 
opposite.50  However, to get less than the pittance provided the 
injured white brakeman is to get little indeed. 
 
2. Victories at Trial, and Race-Based Remittitur 
 
Black plaintiffs won in front of juries for various types of tort 
claims in all regions, and appellate courts often affirmed those 
verdicts.51  Many involved claims against large defendants such as 
 
47. BRITTINGHAM, supra note 46, at 271. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. See WITT, supra note 39, at 64 (“The rise of faultless injuries [in work-
accident cases] precipitated a compensation crisis.”). 
51. Wriggins, Torts, supra note 1, at 100 n.7. 
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railroads for severe physical injuries.52  Some recovered for injuries 
that did not involve actual physical harm or contact.53  These types 
of tort claims involved psychological and dignitary injuries, and 
resulted in recovery of mental distress damages.54  Not all claims 
were against large defendants.  In one Louisiana case, for example, 
parents of a nine-year-old “colored boy” fatally shot by a fourteen-
year-old child of a neighbor playing with a gun recovered $5,000 
from the parents of the neighbor.55  It is currently impossible to 
calculate figures like relative success rates at trial, reversal rates on 
appeal, and the like, because of the methodological issues mentioned 
earlier. 
Given the racial caste system, it would not be surprising if 
many white actors in the torts system were more reluctant to 
recognize and compensate injuries to the psyches and dignity of 
African-Americans than to recognize and compensate their physical 
injuries.  One example suggesting this possibility was a 1909 case 
seeking compensation for false imprisonment brought by a black 
Pullman porter falsely accused of stealing tickets and money.56  A 
rich white financier, James Brady, made the false accusation, which 
resulted in porter Frank Griffin being briefly imprisoned before he 
was freed.57  Since Griffin had neither suffered physical injury nor 
lost his job, the damages were essentially either mental distress 
damages, punitive damages, or both.  The jury recognized Griffin’s 
injury and awarded him $2,500.58  The trial judge, former 
 
52. Public recognition of these successes was important to some African-
Americans, as the NAACP reported on some of them in The Crisis magazine.  Id. 
at 107 n.33. 
53. See, e.g., Wilson v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 113 S.E. 508 (N.C. 1922) 
(upholding a black woman’s battery verdict against Singer Sewing Machine for 
actions of rental agent in trying to repossess sewing machine by grabbing machine 
from plaintiff’s hands while in her own home); Brown v. Crawford, 177 S.W.2d 1 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1943) (affirming successful assault case of black former employee 
of distillery for manager charging after him and shooting at him, although manager 
missed). 
54. Prosser and Keeton wrote about the tort of assault that “the plaintiff is 
protected against a purely mental disturbance . . . .” KEETON ET AL., supra note 46, 
§ 10, at 43 (5th ed. 1984). 
55. Sutton v. Champagne, 75 So. 209, 210–11 (La. 1917).  
56. Negro Not Equal to White: Suffers Less Humiliation in False Arrest, 
Court Holds, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1909, at 16, col. 2. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 




                                                
Congressman Dugro, reduced the verdict to $300, stating, “[i]n one 
sense, a colored man is just as good as a white man, for the law says 
he is, but he has not the same amount of injury under all 
circumstances that a white man would have.”59  Because blacks in 
the first place have a lower status, he asserted, the damage caused by 
being falsely imprisoned was necessarily less.60 
The judge imposed a race-based standard to measure the 
damages remedy and reduce compensation to the black plaintiff.61  
Tellingly, his remittitur was affirmed in three appellate opinions, 
none of which discussed the substance of his action.62  The trial 
court and appellate decisions received considerable critical attention 
in newspaper editorials across the United States, but minimal 
attention in contemporaneous legal scholarship.63  The fact that the 
judge’s explicitly racist reduction was affirmed by appellate courts, 
but criticized by the press, sent the following two-part message to 
judges deciding cases after Griffin v. Brady: first, if you think 
damage verdicts for black plaintiffs excessive because you think 
black plaintiffs deserve less than white plaintiffs, go ahead and 
reduce the verdicts pursuant to your discretion; second, do not be 
overt about your reasons for reducing the verdicts, or you may be 
loudly criticized in the press.  It is almost impossible to know how 
frequently this kind of reduction happened in the wake of Griffin, but 
the common law system worked by just this kind of mechanism, 
where appellate decisions both resolved past cases and gave forward-
looking messages to judges about what would be acceptable and 
what would be beyond the pale.  It is plausible to assume that the 






62. Griffin v. Brady, 117 N.Y.S. 1136 (App. Div. 1909) (mem.), aff’d per 
curiam, 118 N.Y.S. 240 (App. Div. 1909) (denying motion for reargument), aff’d, 
126 N.Y.S. 1139 (App. Div. 1910) (mem.). 
63. E.g., Discrimination on a Wrong Basis, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1909, at 6 
(evaluating Justice Dugro’s analysis); Gilbert Thomas Stephenson, Race 
Distinctions in American Law, 43 AMER. L. REV. 869, 905 (1909).  This case is 
discussed further in Wriggins, Torts, supra note 1, at 130–35.  
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3. Use of Segregated Precedents 
 
By and large, the tort remedies for African-American 
plaintiffs were determined by the usual tort approach of 
individualized, case-by-case settlement or trial.  As in other tort 
contexts, the notion of rigorously comparing case outcomes to 
determine whether like cases were being treated alike was alien.  
Notwithstanding this general practice, some judges at times have 
attempted to make decisions on damages through comparing damage 
amounts awarded in similar cases.64 
A comparative approach to remedy makes the choice of a 
comparison framework central to the analysis.  Demonstrating this 
importance, some Louisiana courts in the 1930s, in determining 
damage amounts in wrongful death cases for black decedents, chose 
as their comparisons only cases involving prior deaths of black 
people.  For example, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals 
overturned a defense verdict and awarded money to the parents of a 
black twenty-nine year old killed by a night watchman, stating in 
part, 
 
[I]n the . . . case of Shamburg v. Thompson, Trustee, 
we affirmed an award of $3200 to the mother of a 
twenty two year old colored boy who was injured by 
the train at nine o’clock in the morning and died in 
the afternoon of the same day.  The parents of a 
twenty-nine year old colored boy were allowed 
$6,000 for loss of love and affection, support etc., and 
for the pain and suffering of the deceased in the case 
of Rousseau v. Texas & Pac. R. Co., et al. We have 
 
64. See, e.g., Jutzi-Johnson v. U.S., 263 F.3d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 2001) (“To 
minimize the arbitrary variance in awards bound to result from [the typical] throw-
up-the-hands approach, the trier of fact should . . . be informed of the amounts of 
pain and suffering damages awarded in similar cases.  And when the trier of fact is 
a judge, he should be required . . . to set forth in his opinion the damages awards 
that he considered comparable.  We make such comparisons routinely.”); Seffert v. 
L.A. Transit Auth., 364 P.2d 337, 346–47 (Cal. 1961) (Traynor, J., dissenting) 
(“Although excessive damages is an issue which is primarily factual and is not 
therefore a matter which can be decided upon the basis of the awards made in 
other cases, awards for similar injuries may be considered as one factor to be 
weighed in determining whether the damages awarded are excessive.”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 




                                                
decided to fix the award in this case at $3500, which 
amount we believe to be proper under the facts and 
circumstance of the case.”65 
 
Prior damage awards for deaths of white people decided by the same 
court were treated as not relevant to determining the appropriate 
remedial amount for deaths of black people.66 
It is easy to see now how problematic and objectionable this 
is.  The deaths of black people were placed in a different category 
from deaths of white people.  Moreover, using “black-only” 
precedent to determine damages, going back in time to earlier 
periods not long past slavery where education and wage disparities 
may have been even more pronounced, and applying those decisions 
to more recent torts, clearly reinscribes past discrimination on more 
recent cases.  This use of precedent to determine damage amounts 
should give us pause because of the choice of framework and 
because it imposes past values on recent harm. 
 
4. Mortality Tables, Race, and Pecuniary Loss 
 
A New York admiralty case about a boat crash on a foggy 
night in the early twentieth century contains an extraordinary 
discussion about mortality tables that shows how racially influenced 
judgments about the value of a person’s life have affected courts’ 
views of the proper methodology to use in valuing such lives.  The 
case, The Saginaw and the Hamilton, resulting from a collision 
between two boats in fog caused by the fault of both pilots, included 
discussion of the wrongful death cases of the eight people who 
drowned.67  Six of the eight were “colored” and two of the eight 
were “white.”  Although the case eventually reached the United 
States Supreme Court and resulted in an affirmance by Justice 
Holmes, the trial judge’s analysis of race and mortality tables was 
not mentioned in the appellate opinions. 
 
65. Young v. Broussard, 189 So. 477, 481 (La. Ct. App. 1939) (internal 
citations omitted). 
66. Wriggins, Torts, supra note 1, at 125. 
67. 139 F. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1905).  The liability portion of the analysis is 
contained in In re Clyde S.S. Co., 134 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1904). 
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The damage law that applied to this collision was that of 
Delaware, which allowed only pecuniary loss damages to the 
surviving family members in wrongful death actions.68  An 
admiralty commissioner made a preliminary decision on damage 
amounts, using standard mortality tables to estimate the life 
expectancies of the drowning victims, and in turn to gauge the 
pecuniary loss of the surviving family members.69  Federal District 
Judge Adams, handling an appeal by the ship companies from the 
commissioner’s decision, substantially reduced the damages for the 
surviving family members of both the black and the white 
decedents.70  Judge Adams flatly rejected the use of mortality tables, 
although they were already commonly used in litigation for just this 
purpose.71  Adams wrote that mortality tables “are very useful in 
insurance matters, but seem to afford little real aid in determining the 
duration of life in such cases as are now presented . . . .  I have no 
confidence in, and less respect for, these tables made up by insurance 
agents, in which, of course, large allowance must be made for heavy 
commission, expenses, and profit.  And this is especially true where 
colored persons are concerned.”72  He then quoted and included in 
his published opinion racially specific life expectancy tables based 
on census data from the 1896 book by Frederick L. Hoffman, Race 
Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro.73  These showed 
shorter life expectancies for “colored” people and purportedly 
showed “the difference in the vitality of the two races.”74  Frederick 
Hoffman is remembered for having claimed that the black population 
would eventually die out altogether because of its race-based 
“immorality,” based on statistical analysis of comparative mortality 
and other figures,75 and for being a prominent proponent of what 
 
68. The Saginaw, 139 F. at 906 (“The measure of damages is such a sum as 
the deceased would probably have earned in his business during life, and would 
have gone to his next of kin, taking into consideration the age of the deceased, his 
ability, disposition to labor, habits of living and expenditure.”). 
69. Id. at 914–15. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 913–14 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 
73. Id. at 914. 
74. Id. 
75. Brian Glenn, The Shifting Rhetoric of Insurance Denial, 34 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 779, 790–91 (2000).  Glenn quotes the following passage from the Hoffman 
book on which Adams relied: 
 




                                                                                                                
now is often termed “scientific racism.”76  Judge Adams thought that 
using “blended,” race-neutral mortality tables, which presumably 
combined mortality data on whites and blacks, to estimate blacks’ 
life expectancies, would overestimate blacks’ life expectances.77  To 
then base pecuniary loss estimates on those tables would be too 
generous to the surviving family members of black decedents, 
because of the shorter life expectancies of blacks.78 
Judge Adams, significantly, did not substitute race-specific 
mortality tables from the census data.79  Those race-specific 
mortality tables would have made the lost wage calculations lower, 
and hence the pecuniary loss calculations lower, than would using 
the mortality tables the commissioner applied.80  Adams’ assumption 
seems to have been that even using race-specific mortality tables 
based on past census data would overestimate black life expectancies 
For the root of the evil lies in the fact of an immense amount of 
immorality, which is a race trait, and of which scrofula, syphilis, and even 
consumption are the inevitable consequences.  So long as more than one-
fourth (26.5 per cent. in 1894) of the births for the colored population of 
Washington are illegitimate,—a city in which we should expect to meet 
with the least amount of immorality and vice, in which at the same time 
only 2.6 per cent. of the births among the whites are illegitimate,—it is 
plain why we should meet with a mortality from scrofula and syphilis so 
largely in excess of that of the whites.  And it is also plain now, that we 
have reached the underlying causes of the excessive mortality from 
consumption and the enormous waste of child life.  It is not in the 
conditions of life, but in the race traits and tendencies that we find the 
causes of the excessive mortality.  So long as these tendencies are 
persisted in, so long as immorality and vice are a habit of life of the vast 
majority of the colored population, the effect will be to increase the 
mortality by hereditary transmission of weak constitutions, and to lower 
still further the rate of natural increase, until the births fall below the 
deaths, and gradual extinction results. 
 
Id. 
76. Beatrix Hoffman, Scientific Racism, Insurance, and Opposition to the 
Welfare State: Frederick L. Hoffman’s Transatlantic Journey, 2 J. GILDED AGE & 
PROGRESSIVE ERA 2 (2003), available at http://www.historycooperative.org/cgi-
bin/justtop.cgi?act=justtop&url=http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/jga/ 
2.2/hoffman.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
77. The Saginaw, 139 F. at 914. 
78. Id. at 914–16. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
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because, according to Hoffman, blacks’ lifespans were further 
decreasing due to the “difference in vitality”81 of the two races. 
Ironically, instead of using “better” race-specific mortality 
tables from the census to calculate the pecuniary loss remedy, he 
used an intuitive method, judging for himself how long he thought 
the decedents would have lived if they had not drowned, and meting 
out what he thought the surviving family members of each decedent 
would have received from the decedent.82  He rejected the use of 
tables altogether to arrive at a sum that seemed fitting.83  Although 
he lowered all the awards, on average he lowered the awards for the 
deaths of blacks ten percent more than the awards for the deaths of 
whites and he slashed three of the awards for blacks by forty percent 
or more.84 
From today’s perspective, Judge Adams and Frederick 
Hoffman were clearly wrong in their projections into the future.  
Judge Adams’ approach, particularly given his seeming agreement 
with Frederick Hoffman’s analysis, is also problematic because its 
individualized, intuitive method of determining remedies allows race 
and racism to have tremendous influence in ways that are nearly 
impossible to prove.  While the idea of using group-based tables or 
generalizations to make decisions about damage remedy amounts is 
appealing in order to escape from the subjectivity of the intuitive 
method, any decision to use a group-based projection into the future 
as the basis for a damage remedy also involves normative judgments 
about the relevant frame of reference and the rate of future change.85 
 
 
81. Id. at 914. 
82. For example, regarding one victim, Sarah Elam, he wrote: 
 
The deceased was a colored stewardess on the Saginaw.  She was 53 
years of age and earned $10 per month with board.  The latter was worth 
to her about $17 per month.  She left three children who were more or 
less dependent upon her for support.  The claimant was allowed $2,500.  
In view of the age of the deceased and her small earning capacity, I think 
the award was excessive and should be reduced to $1,500. 
 
Id. at 915. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 914–916. 
85. Chamallas, Civil Rights, supra note 1, at 1446. 




                                                
5. Wrongful Death and Survival Damages in 
Louisiana 
 
In order to examine how damages remedies may have been 
affected by race and racism, I read all the Louisiana appellate 
wrongful death and survival cases published between 1900 and 1950 
dealing with the amounts of damages, of which there were 152.  
Twenty-six were brought by families identified as “Negro” or 
“colored,” while the remaining 126 were brought by whites.86  
Louisiana’s pertinent code provision allowed surviving family 
members in a wrongful death case to recover not only for pecuniary 
loss, grief, and loss of consortium, but also allowed the decedent’s 
pain and suffering and lost wages to be recovered.87  Louisiana cases 
were particularly rich with detail because, since Louisiana is a civil 
code state rather than a common law state, appellate review allowed 
judges to closely review facts, make their own factual 
determinations, and decide damage amounts.88  Damage amounts 
awarded to surviving black family members overall were less than 
half amounts awarded to surviving white family members.  The 
median award for black family members per case was $3,200, while 
the median award for white family members per case was $7,021.  
The average award for black family members per case was $3,559, 
while the average award for white family members per case was 
$8,245.  The highest awards for both blacks and whites were for the 
deaths of husband-breadwinners, who had been supporting a wife 
and children, and the highest white award was more than double the 
highest black award.  No clear pattern emerged as to appellate courts 
reversing jury verdicts for blacks or whites.  Indeed, on occasion 
appellate courts reversed defense verdicts against black plaintiffs and 
ordered judgments in favor of black plaintiffs.  Comparison of some 
contemporaneous cases from the same courts suggests “racially 
selective empathy,”89 in which judges seem to value pain and 
 
86. The Louisiana materials are discussed in more detail in Wriggins, Torts, 
supra note 1, at 110–29.  I also reviewed cases from 1865–1900 dealing with 
amounts of damages, of which there were less than five.  This research is also part 
of a larger project on wrongful death cases generally. 
87. LA. CIV. CODE ANN., art. 2315 (2005). 
88. See Wriggins, Torts, supra note 1, at 110–30 (discussing appellate review 
of Louisiana wrongful death cases from 1940–1949). 
89. Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, 
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suffering and even lost wages of white decedents more highly than 





Methodological problems mentioned earlier continue to make 
definitive conclusions elusive.  The race of litigants is mentioned in 
appellate tort opinions less and less frequently from 1950 on.  No 
longer is the civil justice system ‘white’ in exactly the way it was 
earlier.  African-Americans can be jurors, and there are some 
African-American lawyers and judges. Anecdotal information, 
however, suggests devaluation patterns endure.90  Race-specific 
worklife expectancy tables are used in cases where plaintiffs have no 
established work history, and these clearly disadvantage minority 
plaintiffs since they project lower earnings for racial minorities.91  
Empirical studies on the effect of race on damage outcomes point in 
contrasting directions. 
One of the few studies with data on race and tort remedies is 
the well-known “Cook County Study.”92  The Cook County study 
was an analysis of over 9,000 civil jury trials in Cook County, 
Illinois that took place between 1959 and 1979.93  Focusing only on 
race in terms of black and white, the authors found that “race seemed 
to have a pervasive influence on the outcomes of civil jury trials,” 
that black plaintiffs lost more often than white plaintiffs in similar 
cases, and that the disadvantage for black plaintiffs was not less near 
the end of the study period.94  This study noted that successful black 
plaintiffs received awards only 74% as large as white plaintiffs’ 
and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1420 (1988); see Wriggins, 
Torts, supra note 1, at 122–24 (discussing case comparisons). 
90. Frank M. McClellan, The Dark Side of Tort Reform: Searching for Racial 
Justice, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 761, 780 (1996). 
91. Chamallas, Civil Rights, supra note 1, at 1438–39.  Canadian 
jurisprudence has much more directly explored the ramifications of using race- and 
gender-specific worklife expectancy tables, as discussed in Chamallas, Civil 
Rights, supra note 1. 
92. AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: 
WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS (1985). 
93  Id. at v. 
94. Id. at viii. 




nomic losses.  
                                                
awards in comparable cases.95  The authors also found that black 
plaintiffs were underrepresented relative to their proportion in the 
population, suggesting contingent fee lawyers may have been less 
willing to take their cases.96  If so, perhaps this was because 
damages like lost wages were low, the authors suggested.97  Neil 
Vidmar has criticized the supposition that juries discriminate against 
black plaintiffs, and suggested other possible explanations.  He 
posits that perhaps less competent lawyers represented blacks, 
perhaps black clients could not afford economic or other experts to 
demonstrate the cost of their injuries, or perhaps black litigants had 
lower eco 98
A fascinating, more recent study concluded, based on an 
impressive array of data, that average jury verdicts significantly 
increased as black county poverty rates increased.99  It also found 
that jury verdicts increased as Hispanic county poverty rates 
increased, although the authors were less sure of that conclusion 
because of definitional issues.100  Noting the paucity of research on 
race and the civil justice system in contrast to the better-studied 
relationship between race and the criminal justice system, the 
authors’ general hypothesis is that jury population affects tort 
awards.101  The study did not include actual jury composition but 
inferred higher black jury populations from higher black and 
Hispanic populations in certain counties.102  It also did not have data 
on the race of plaintiffs or defendants.  The study also noted that 
increases in the white poverty rate actually led to decreases in verdict 
 
95.  Id. 
96. Neil Vidmar, Making Inferences About Jury Behavior from Jury Verdict 
Statistics, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 599, 606 (1994). 
97. CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 92, at ix. 
98. Vidmar, supra note 96, at 606. 
99. Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Race, Poverty, and American Tort 
Awards: Evidence from Three Data Sets, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 26, 51–52 (2003).  
One large state court dataset dealt with trials from 1997–1998, a smaller federal 
court dataset dealt with trials from 1988–1997, and an additional state court dataset 
covered trials from 1991–1992.  Id. at 29–32.  The study also found that increases 
in the black poverty rates increased settlement amounts in those counties.  Id. at 
50.  What the authors mean by “black poverty rate” is the “number of in-poverty 
blacks as a percentage of the county population.”  Id. at 38. 
100. Id. at 47. 
101. Id. at 38. 
102. Id. at 52. 
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size.103  The authors did not draw conclusions about causation, but 
they did control for many variables that might have influenced the 
result.104  The authors note that “[o]ne hypothesis that could explain 
our results is that poor black and Hispanic jurors decide cases 
differently from white jurors of all poverty levels.  Given the 
different life experiences of poor black and Hispanic jury members 
relative to whites of all poverty levels, it appears plausible that the 
decisions of such jurors about justice and due compensation could 
differ significantly from those of other jurors.”105  One revealing 
observation is that while some may argue that these data show that 
verdicts are ‘too high’ in poverty-stricken areas with predominately 
black and Hispanic populations, this ‘too high’ conclusion is only 
sound if you take the proper norm as being the norm in other areas.  
If you take the verdicts from black and poor, and Hispanic and poor 
areas reported in the study as the norm, verdicts elsewhere are ‘too 
low.’  Particularly given the seemingly disparate conclusions of the 
various studies, more research into contemporary dynamics of race 





The most common tort remedy is money damages for 
individuals.  When black plaintiffs brought damages cases, tort 
remedies for individuals could, and did, have broad implications for 
persons other than the plaintiffs.  An outstanding example of this is 
the important Fifth Circuit case of Bullock v. Tamiami Trails Tours, 
where the Fifth Circuit in 1959 held that a bus company was liable 
for injuries that a black married couple seated in the front of a bus 
suffered when a white passenger assaulted and battered them.106  
Tort law in this case served as a civil rights remedy, putting other 
interstate bus companies on notice that their obligations included 
protecting black passengers sitting in the front of buses. 
Given the importance of race and racism in our nation’s legal 
history, it would be astonishing if race and racism played no role in 
the assessment of damages.  New attention to race and damages, 
 
103. Id. at 43. 
104. Id. at 41–49. 
105. Id. at 52. 
106. 266 F.2d at 332. 




particularly from Emancipation to 1950, paints a complex picture 
showing that race and racism are not extrinsic to torts but are as 
surely a part of it as is industrial development.  Torts used an 
individualized market mechanism, the contingency fee agreement, 
which broadened access to remedies beyond what it would have been 
in the absence of that mechanism.  Yet that same commitment to 
individualized remedial measures allowed great subjectivity, 
variation, and bias in settlements, trials, and appeals.  In other words, 
the system allowed great latitude for like cases to be treated 
differently.  Indeed, claims brought by African-American plaintiffs 
often seem to have been valued for less than comparable claims 
brought by whites.  Moreover, the cumulative effect of even small 
differences in damage remedies may be great over time.  The 
individualized enforcement mechanism and corresponding room for 
subjectivity, variation, and bias remain past 1950.  More recent 
evidence is somewhat contradictory but does confirm the conclusion 
that race is significant in tort remedies. 
 The contemporary quest for ways to make damage remedies 
more consistent should be informed by examples from the racial 
history of tort law.  The decision to use a particular framework of 
comparison is key, as we see in the “black-only” precedents chosen 
by some Louisiana courts in the 1930s to value (and devalue) the 
loss of black lives.  Moreover, our search for neutral and consistent 
group-based predictions to estimate life expectancy and lost earnings 
is bound to be hounded by normative judgments.  Federal Judge 
Adams’ decision in early twentieth century New York, refusing to 
apply race-neutral mortality tables to pecuniary loss calculations for 
deaths of black people because he thought the black race would die 
out, is emblematic of the challenging nature of this search.  If 
decisionmakers are attuned to the assumptions animating the choices 
of frameworks, tort remedies may hold promise for greater equity in 
the future. 
